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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the adjustment of inflation with financial dynamic fundamentals of 
money (financial depth), credit (financial activity) and efficiency. Three main findings are 
established. (1) There are significant long-run relationships between inflation and the 
fundamentals. (2) The error correction mechanism is stable in all specifications but in case of 
any disequilibrium, only financial depth is significant in adjusting inflation to the long-run 
relationship. (3) In the long-run, short-term adjustments in the ability of banks to transform 
money into credit do not matter in correcting inflation. This is most probably due to surplus 
liquidity issues. Policy implications are discussed.  
JEL Classification: E31: E51; O55 
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1. Introduction 
  
The positive linkage between money and prices is well established in the economic 
literature. A substantial consensus exists on both the direction and the dimension of the effect 
of an increase in monetary aggregate (irrespective of the definition adopted) on price 
movements (Roffia & Zaghini, 2007). The stance that, in equilibrium monetary policy is 
neutral hinges on the quantity equation which in turn defines a positive “one-to-one” linkage 
between monetary and price growth over the a long-term horizon. In other words, monetary 
policy is neutral over the long-run. Despite a theoretical consensus on money neutrality that 
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has been well documented in empirical literature (Lucas, 1980; Gerlach & Svensson, 2003), 
the role of money as an informational variable for money policy decision has remained 
opened to debate (Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Nogueira, 2009; Bhaduri & Durai, 2012). Indeed 
empirical works provide mixed results and findings depend on selected countries and 
historical periods under consideration (Stock & Watson, 1999; Dwyer & Hafer, 1999; 
Trecroci & Vega-Croissier, 2000; Leeper & Roush, 2002). On a specific note, many studies 
have concluded that, significant money stock expansions that are not coupled with sustained 
credit increases are less likely to have inflationary consequences (Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; 
Borio & Lowe, 2002; Borio and Lowe, 2004; Detken & Smets, 2004; Van den Noord, 2006; 
Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Bhaduri & Durai, 2012). This position could be particularly 
questionable in Africa, given the high surplus liquidity issues the financial system of the 
continent is facing. Simply put, while inflation has soared in many countries in recent years 
(Simpasa et al., 2011), surplus liquidity has remained an issue (Saxegaard, 2006).  
 The current paper is based on the consensus that, money stock expansions that are not 
coupled with sustained credit increases are less likely to have inflation consequences. 
Accordingly, we reframe the consensus into an important question policy makers are most 
likely to ask today.  In the long-run, do short-term adjustments in the ability of banks to 
transform money into credit matter in correcting inflation?   
It is important to reframe the consensus with a new question for three main reasons: 
recent food price hikes; inadequate monetary policy to tackle food inflation and; the debate on 
inherent inconsistency of monetary policy effectiveness in African countries. Firstly, with the 
dramatic rise in the price of stable food commodities over the past decade
1
, while the 
literature on the causes and impacts of the crisis in global food prices in the developing world 
                                                 
1
 In fact during the past decade, the world has seen a dramatic rise in the price of many staple food commodities. 
For example, the price of maize increased by 80% between 2005-2007 and has since soared even further. Many 
other commodity prices also rose sharply over this period: milk powder by 90%, rice by 25% and wheat by 70%. 
Such large changes in prices have had tremendous impacts on the incomes of poor households in developing 
countries (FAO, 2007; World Bank 2008; Ivanic & Martin, 2008).  
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has mushroomed in recent years (Piesse & Thirtle, 2009; Wodon & Zaman, 2010; Masters & 
Shively, 2008), we are unaware of studies that have closely examined how financial policies 
affected consumer prices. Hence, correcting inflation is particularly important in fighting 
poverty (Funjii, 2011) on the one hand and; on the other hand directly (Ibeh et al., 2007; 
Acquaah et al., 2008; Musila & Al-Zyoud, 2012) or indirectly (Asongu 2012, 2013a; Bartels 
et al., 2009; Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Tuomi, 2011) eases the doing of business in Africa. 
Secondly, consistent with Von Braum (2008), monetary and exchange rate policy responses 
were not effective in addressing the recent waves of food inflation. This assertion by the 
Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute has also motivated us to 
reframe the consensus. Thirdly, the debate on the inherent ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
in African countries has recently gained renewed attention (Weeks, 2010)
2
.  
Providing an answer to the question motivating the inquiry can advance knowledge 
along two main avenues: the use of hitherto unemployed monetary policy aggregates and 
assessing how tackling African over-liquidity issues with financial allocation efficiency 
policies affect inflation.  Firstly, we deviate from mainstream literature that is directly focused 
on interest rate or exchange rate (e.g Egypt manages interest rates while Lesotho puts greater 
emphasis on reserves) and employ financial dynamic fundamentals of monetary policy. 
Hence, to tackle the inquiry the long-run incidences of money (financial depth), credit 
(financial activity) and efficiency (of allocation) on inflation are tested and associated 
misalignments are derived in order to examine which short-run adjustments matter in 
correcting inflation. Secondly, assessment of the problem statement is carefully calibrated to 
incorporate the substantially documented issue of excess liquidity in African financial 
institutions that weakens monetary policy effectiveness (Saxegaard, 2006; Agénor et al., 
2004; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998)
3
.  
                                                 
2
 Please see the last paragraphs of Section 2.2.1 below for more insights into the debate.  
3
 Please see last paragraph of Section 2.2.2 for more details.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief review of existing literature on 
inflation, monetary policy and African business is covered in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
data and discusses the methodology. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Inflation, monetary policy and African business  
 
2.1 Inflation as an African business challenge 
 
 In this section we devote space to discussing inflation as a risk of doing business in 
Africa in three main strands. The first highlights some useful statistics. The second strand 
presents useful theoretical underpinnings motivating the risky character of inflation in doing 
business. In the third strand, we discuss complementary findings from recent African business 
literature.  
 In the first strand, according to The Economist (2012), inflation in Africa has now 
returned to levels recorded before the commodity price spike in 2007/2008. In sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), the average rate of inflation jumped to 11.7% in 2008 against the backdrop of 
soaring oil and food prices, but retreated to 8.5% in 2009 as the global downturn mitigated 
price pressures. The average rate was projected to hover in the horizon of 7.1% between 2010 
and 2012. Consistent with The Economist, inflation will remain comparatively high in a 
global context and will remain vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity and product markets. 
Accordingly, the ongoing power crisis, severe infrastructure bottlenecks and higher tariffs will 
contribute to increasing the phenomenon. Data from the World Bank indicates that in Africa 
only 6.6% of land is irrigated compared with 33.3% in Asia and 15% in Latin America (The 
Economist, 2012). Recent pressures in food markets have proven inflationary in SSA, 
especially given the high proportion of disposable income spend on food by Africa’s poorer 
consumers. The issue of whether Africa can become the global food basket is discussed at 
great length by African leaders, donors and investors. 
5 
 
The second strand highlights theoretical underpinnings on how inflation could help 
debtors like governments but hurt consumers, producers and paper assets holders. The nexus 
between inflation and business challenges in Africa will be discussed in three perspectives: 
how inflation affects businesses, inflation and cost of borrowing and, the cost of inflation on 
businesses that trade abroad. Firstly, we discuss how the cost of inflation affects businesses in 
Africa. Constantly increasing prices leads to ‘menu costs’, where African companies will 
have to spend money changing and reprinting their prices. Moreover, it also leads to 
uncertainty, making planning of production difficult. When prices are raised, infuriated 
consumers blame producers for increasing them.  When businesses try to avoid raising prices, 
it squeezes profits margins and could cause companies to sell commodities for less in real 
terms than they cost to produce. A policy which may ultimately lead to bankruptcy in the 
long-term. When the inflation rate is soaring, employees demand higher wages from 
employers, who are poised to raise prices in order to maintain the profit margin. Secondly, 
inflation substantially increases the cost of borrowing. On the one hand, borrowing in a high 
inflation environment implies that businesses will have to generate profits at the height of the 
inflation rate just to break-even, which in itself is an additional uncertainty. On the other 
hand, high inflation and the idea that debts would have to be paid-off with cheaper money 
may encourage businesses to make unsound investments. In many cases, high inflation rates 
inadvertently turn normally conservative businessmen into wild speculators either based on 
the cost of doing their normal business or in relation to stock prices or currency fluctuations. 
Thirdly, inflation could significantly affect the cost of doing business for African companies 
that trade abroad. Since inflation does not only erode the value of money but also affects the 
value of a currency relative to other currencies, it is particularly relevant for companies with 
an export led growth model.  
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In the third strand, recent African business literature has substantially directly or 
indirectly documented the peril of inflation in the ease of doing business in Africa. Ibeh et al. 
(2007) have explored the key factors stimulating initial export activity among Nigerian firms 
against the backdrop of previous findings and found that proactive stimuli, including growth 
aspirations, opportunity search among others, predominantly trigger initial export activity 
among Nigerian firms. Based on the relevance of the theoretical underpinnings highlighted in 
the first view of the second strand above, it is evident that inflation would seriously deter 
these proactive stimuli. Acquaah et al. (2008) have examined the impact of the 
implementation of competitive strategy on organizational performance in response to 
economic liberalization and found that low-cost and integrated low-cost are positively related 
to performance (return on assets and return on sales). In light of the second perspective of the 
second strand above, soaring prices drive cost-push inflation which is inherently detrimental 
to a low-cost business strategy. Musila & Al-Zyoud (2012) have recently assessed the 
relationship between volatility in exchange rates and the volume of international trade in SSA 
and found a statistically significant nexus between the volatility in exchange rates and the 
volume of trade. Given the positive link between inflation and exchange rate volatility 
highlighted in the third perspective of the second strand above, less inflation will guarantee 
some threshold of exchange rate stability which would significantly increase the volume of 
bilateral trade in the SSA region. Ultimately, low inflation in Africa would improve 
opportunities for efficient alternative forms of investment in compensation for the failed 
privatization projects. Consistent with Asongu (2012, 2013a) SSA’s share of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) averages 1% of global flows (Bartels et al., 2009) and there is a pressing 
need for generation of private capital flows that are complementary to FDI  (Rolfe & 
Woodward, 2004). Low inflation will ease the recommendation of Darley (2012) in the 
expansion of regional trade arrangements as key to looking outside traditional flows of FDI to 
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Africa, which have been largely limited by political economy considerations, regulatory 
uncertainty, skills, labor, regulation and exchange rate volatility (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 
2011). 
 
 
2.2 Inflation and monetary policy in Africa 
 
2.2.1 Highlights of the debate  
 Consistent with Asongu (2013b), the debate over the role of money as an 
informational variable for monetary policy decision can be highlighted in two strands: the 
traditional discretionary monetary policy strand and, the second strand of non-traditional 
policy regimes that limit the ability of monetary authorities to use policy to offset output and 
price fluctuations. 
 In recent years, the benefits of shifting from traditional discretionary monetary policy 
to arrangements that favor commitments to price stability and international economic 
integration (such as inflation targeting, monetary unions, dollarization...etc) have been 
covered substantially. An appealing motivation for discretionary policy is that, the monetary 
authority can use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing 
expansionary policy when output is below its potential and, contractionary policy when output 
is above its potential. For example in the former situation, a policy-controlled interest rate can 
be lowered in an effort to reduce commercial interest rates and stimulate aggregate spending. 
On the other hand, a monetary expansion that brings down the real exchange rate may 
improve the competitiveness of a country’s products in domestic and world markets and 
hence, boost demand for national output (Starr, 2005; Asongu, 2013b). Consistent with the 
empirical literature, as a matter of principle a flexible countercyclical monetary policy can be 
practiced with inflation targeting (Ghironi & Rebucci, 2000; Mishkin, 2002).   
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 In the second strand, non-traditional policy regimes restrict the ability of the monetary 
authorities to use policy to offset output and price fluctuations. The degree to which a given 
country can use monetary policy to affect output in the short-term and prices in the long-run is 
open to debate. For example, results for the US have shown that, a decline in the key interest 
rate controlled by the Federal Reserve tends to boost output over the next 2-3 years. However 
the impact dissipates thereafter so that the long-run effect is limited to prices (Starr, 2005). 
Accordingly, several studies have examined whether the short-run effects of monetary policy 
on output in other countries is similar to those in the US. Conflicting results have been found 
in seventeen industrialized countries (Hayo, 1999). Agenor et al. (2000) have studied two 
middle-income countries and found no evidence of Granger-causality from money to output, 
regardless of money used. Hafer & Kutan (2002) have established that interest rate generally 
plays a relatively more important role in explaining output in twenty OECD countries whereas 
Ganev et al. (2002) have found no such evidence in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) continues to place great emphasis on monetary policy in 
its programs for developing countries, especially SSA. It considers such policy as crucial in 
stabilizing the real exchange rate and managing inflation. This IMF approach has been 
criticized as absurdly inappropriate since the vast majority of governments in SSA lack the 
instruments to make monetary policy effective (Weeks, 2010)
4
. 
 
2.2.2 Monetary policy in Africa 
 
 Borrowing from Asongu (2013b), Khan (2011) has recently assessed the relationship 
between the growth of GDP and different monetary aggregates in 20 SSA economies and 
found empirical support for the hypothesis that credit-growth is more closely linked than in 
money-growth to the growth of real GDP. Asongu (2013c) has recently taken a short-run trip 
                                                 
4
 According to Weeks, SSA lacks two main channels for implementing monetary policy: (1) influencing the 
creation of private credit through so-called open market operations and; (2) affecting the borrowing rates for 
private sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the central bank.  
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to embryonic African monetary zones to assess the Schumpeterian thesis for positive 
spillovers of financial services on growth. His findings suggest that, while the journey is 
promising for the East African Monetary (EAMZ), it is lamentable for the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Hence, the results of the EAMZ are broadly consistent with the 
strand of traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements whereas those of the WAMZ 
are in line with the non-traditional strand of regimes in which policy instruments in the short-
run cannot be used to offset adverse shocks to output. Mangani (2011) has examined the 
effects of monetary policy on prices in Malawi and concluded on the lack of unequivocal 
evidence in support of the conventional channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
The results further suggest that exchange rate was the most important variable in predicting 
prices. The study recommends that authorities should be more concerned with imported cost-
push inflation than with demand-pull inflation
5
. With a slight degree of contradiction, 
Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) have also examined the process through which monetary policy 
affects economic activity in Malawi and found that, bank rate is a more effective measure of 
monetary policy than reserve money.  
 Some studies have also focused exclusively on South Africa. In order to demonstrate 
that monetary expansions and contractions may have different effects in different regions of 
the same country, Fielding & Shields (2005) have estimated the size of asymmetries across 
the nine provinces of South Africa (over the period 1997-2005) and found significant 
differences in the response of prices to monetary policy. Gupta et al.  (2010a) have established 
that house price inflation was negatively related to money policy shocks. Gupta et al. (2010b) 
have shown that during the period of financial liberalization, interest rate shocks had 
relatively stronger effects on house price inflation irrespective of house sizes. Ncube & Ndou 
                                                 
5
 Consistent with Mangani (2011) in the short-term, pursuing a prudent exchange rate policy that recognizes the 
country’s precarious foreign reserve position could be critical in deepening domestic price stability. Beyond the 
short-term, policy stability could be sustained via the implementation of policies directed towards the 
construction of a strong foreign exchange reserve base (as well as developing a sustainable approach to the 
country’s reliance on development assistance).  
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(2010) have complemented Gupta et al. (2010ab)
6
 with the emphasis that, the direct effects of 
high interest rates on consumption appear to be more important in transmitting monetary 
policy to the economy than through indirect effects. Therefore, the inference that monetary 
policy tightening can marginally weaken inflationary pressures (resulting from excessive 
consumption) through the credit and house wealth channels.  
While a key economic risk is inflation, a weak monetary policy could also seriously 
exacerbate economic risks (The Economist, 2012). Consistent with Saxegaard (2006), going 
beyond acknowledging the threat of increasing inflation, several authors have observed that 
the abundance of liquidity is likely to have adverse consequences for the ability of monetary 
policy to influence demand conditions and hence, stabilize the economy
7
. Agénor et al. (2004) 
for instance note that if banks already hold liquidity in excess of requirements, attempts by the 
monetary authorities to increase liquidity in a bid to stimulate aggregate demand will prove 
largely ineffective. In the same vein, Nissanke & Aryeetey (1998) argue that in the presence 
of excess liquidity, it becomes difficult to regulate money supply using the required reserve 
ratio and the money multiplier, so that the use of monetary policy for stabilization purposes is 
undermined. Hence, one would expect excess liquidity to weaken the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.   
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 10 African countries with annual data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). The resulting balanced panel is restricted from 1980 to 
                                                 
6
 Gupta et al. (2010ab) do not quantify the indirect effects of interest rate changes working through changes in 
house prices on consumer spending. Ncube & Ndou (2010) have filled this gap by estimating and quantifying the 
role of house wealth in South Africa using disaggregated house prices.  
7
 Saxegaard (2006) is the only study in the literature that is closest to the current paper. The present study steers 
clear of Saxegaard in the conceptual framework, methodological underpinnings and data structure. 
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2010 owing to constraints in data availability. While definition of the variables and 
corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 2, summary statistics and correlation 
analysis are detailed in Appendix 1 and Appendix 3 respectively. Countries included in the 
sample are: Algeria, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania 
and Zambia
8
. Our restriction to these countries is primarily based on the fact that some 
African countries do not exhibit a unit root in consumer price inflation. Owing to the problem 
statement of the study, it is imperative to have non-stationary consumer price inflation for 
consistent modeling. Hence, in accordance with recent African law-finance literature 
(Asongu, 2011a), CFA franc
9
 countries of the CEMAC
10
 and UEMOA
11
 zones have not been 
included
12
. Apart from these justifications  for eliminating CFA franc countries provided by 
preliminary analysis and recent theoretical postulations (Asongu, 2011a), the seminal work of 
Mundell (1972) has shown that, African countries with flexible exchange rates regimes have 
more to experience in ‘money and inflation dynamics’ than their counterparts with fixed 
exchange rate regimes
13
.  
                                                 
8
 Note should be taken of the fact that the Saxegaard (2006) dataset consists of quarterly data from Uganda, 
Nigeria and countries of  the Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States (CEMAC).  
9
The CFA franc is the name of two currencies used in sub-Saharan Africa (by some former French colonies) 
which are guaranteed by the French treasury.  The two currencies though theoretically separate are effectively 
interchangeable and include: the West African CFA franc (used in the UEMOA zone) and the Central African 
CFA franc (used in the CEMAC zone). 
10
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. 
11
 Economic and Monetary Community of  West African States.  
12
The need for inflation to reflect a unit root in order to accommodate the problem statement (and the exclusion 
of CFA franc countries) also draws from an inflation uncertainty theory in recent African finance literature. “The 
dominance of English common–law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal–origins debate 
has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an 'inflation uncertainty theory' in providing theoretical justification 
and empirical validity as to why French civil–law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. 
Inflation uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of 
financial intermediary institutions in English common–law countries. As a policy implication, results support the 
benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency” Asongu (2011a, p.1). 
Also, before limiting the dataset, we have found from preliminary analysis that, African  CFA franc countries 
have a relatively very stable inflation rate.  
13
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition 
has stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; 
stability has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British 
countries by opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and 
better developed monetary institutions.” (Mundell, 1972,  pp. 42-43). 
12 
 
Consistent with the literature (Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Hendrix et al., 2009) and the 
problem statement, the dependent variable is measured in terms of annual percentage change 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI measures changes in the price level of a market 
basket of consumer goods and services purchased by households. For clarity in organization, 
the independent variables are presented in terms of money (financial depth), credit (financial 
activity) and efficiency.  Firstly, from a money standpoint, we are consistent with the FDSD 
and recent African development literature (Asongu, 2011bc) in measuring financial depth 
both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money 
supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. While the former 
denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the latter represents liquid 
liabilities of the financial system. Financial system deposits are demand, savings and time 
deposits. These deposits are liquid liabilities of financial institutions because demand for them 
by depositors is on short notice. It is interesting to distinguish between these two because, 
since we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, a great chunk of the monetary 
base does not transit via the banking sector.  Secondly, credit is measured in terms of financial 
intermediary activity. Hence, the paper seeks to point out the ability of banks to grant credit to 
economic operators.  We measure both banking-system-activity and financial-system-activity 
with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, financial efficiency14 measures 
the ability of deposits (money) to be transformed into credit (financial activity). This third 
measure effectively enables us to assess the hypothesis under investigation because, by 
investigating the inflationary incidence of the ability of banks to fulfill their fundamental role 
of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators, we are also directly 
assessing the hypothesis of whether, significant money stock expansions that are not coupled 
                                                 
14
 By financial efficiency here, we neither refer to the profitability-related notion (concept) nor to the production 
efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). 
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with sustained credit increases are less likely to have inflationary consequences. We adopt 
indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank 
credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: 
Fcfd’). The choice of the efficiency and activity indicators is consistent with recent African 
monetary literature (Asongu, 2013c).  
3.2 Methodology 
The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on the dynamics of 
inflation (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Detken & Smets, 2004; Goujon, 2006). The estimation 
approach entails the following steps: unit root tests, cointegration tests and vector error 
correction model (VECM) estimation. The methodology is broadly consistent with the Engle 
& Granger (1987) theorem. A precondition for the application of a VECM is the presence of 
cointegration which can be tested if the variables exhibit unit roots.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1 Unit root tests 
Accordingly, first-round tests such as unit root tests are required before carrying out a 
panel VECM-based causality test. Most panel unit root tests are based on an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test type: 
1 ,
1
ik
it i i it im i t m it
m
y t y y e    

                                                                         ----- (1)     
where 1it it ity y y    , t is the time trend, k is the lag length and e is the error term. If the null 
hypothesis (H0) is not rejected (i.e. H0: 0  ) then the series is non-stationary. These tests in 
our case include Levin, Lin and Chu (2002, LLC) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003, IPS).  
We test for stationarity with two types of first generational panel unit root tests. When 
the variables exhibit unit roots in level, we proceed to test for stationarity in first difference. 
The application of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) requires that the variables 
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have a unit root (non stationary) in level. Two main types of panel unit root tests have been 
documented: first generational (that assumes cross-sectional independence) and the second 
generational (based on cross-sectional dependence). A precondition for employing the latter 
generational test is a cross-sectional dependence test which is only applicable if the number of 
cross-sections (N) in the panel exceeds the number of periods in the cross-sections (T). Given 
that we have 31 periods (T) and 10 cross-sections (N), we focus on the first generational type. 
To this effect, both the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) 
tests are applied. While the former (LLC, 2002) is a homogenous based panel unit root test 
(common unit as null hypothesis), the latter (IPS, 2003) is a heterogeneous oriented test 
(individual unit roots as null hypotheses). In case the results are different, IPS (2003) takes 
precedence over LLC (2002) in decision making because, according to Maddala & Wu 
(1999), the alternative hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too powerful. Consistent with Liew 
(2004), goodness of fit (or optimal lag selection) is ensured by the Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion (HQC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the LLC (2002) and IPS 
(2003) tests respectively.  
Table 1 below reports the panel unit root tests results. It is observed that, all the 
variables are non stationary in levels; that is, they exhibit a unit root. However, with regard to 
the IPS (2003) results, the variables are stationary in first difference. These findings indicate 
the possibility of cointegration (long-run equilibrium) among the variables; because according 
to the Engel-Granger theorem, two variables that are not stationary may have a linear 
combination in the long-run (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
 “Insert Table 1 here”  
 
4.2 Cointegration tests 
 Consistent with the cointegration theory, two (or more) variables that have a unit root  
in levels may have a linear combination (equilibrium) in the long-term. A distant equilibrium 
15 
 
indicates permanent movements of one variable(s) affect permanent movements in the other 
variable(s). To assess this long-turn relationship, we test for cointegration using the Engle-
Granger based Pedroni test, which is a heterogeneous panel based test. While we have earlier 
applied both homogenous and heterogeneous panel based unit roots tests in Section 4.1, we 
disagree with Camarero & Tamarit (2002) in applying a homogenous Engle-Granger based 
Kao test because, it has less deterministic components. Accordingly, application of Kao 
(1999) in comparison to Pedroni (1999) presents issues in deterministic assumptions
15
. The 
same deterministic trend assumptions employed in the IPS (2003) unit root tests are used in 
the Pedroni (1999) cointegration test. Hence, optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is by the 
AIC. The choice of bivariate statistics has a twofold justification: on the one hand, it is in line 
with the problem statement and on the other hand, it mitigates misspecification issues in 
causality estimations
16
.  
“Insert Table 2 here”  
 Results of the cointegration test are reported in Table 2 above. Based on the findings, 
it is observed that, there is evidence of long-run relationships between either money, credit, or  
efficiency and inflation. It follows that in the distant future, long-run permanent changes in 
either money, credit or efficiency affect permanent changes in inflation and vice versa. Hence, 
the need to assess the short-term adjustments to these equilibriums with the VECM.  
 
4.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
Let us consider inflation and money with no lagged differences, such that: 
 
titi MoneyInflation ,,                                                                                           ----- (2)   
 
The resulting VECMs are the following: 
 
                                                 
15
 While Pedroni (1999) is applied in the presence of both ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’, Kao (1999) is 
based only on the former (constant).  
16
 For example, multivariate cointegration may involve variables that are stationary in levels (See Gries et al., 
2009).  
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titititi MoneyInflationInflation ,1,1,, )(                                                 ----- (3)   
titititi ekInflationMoneyMoney ,1,1,, )(                                                   ----- (4)   
 
 In Eqs. (2) and (3), the right hand terms are the Error Correction Terms (ECTs). At 
equilibrium, the value of the ECT is zero. When the ETC is non-zero, it implies that inflation 
and money have deviated from the long-run equilibrium; and the ECT helps each variable to 
adjust and partially restore the equilibrium. The speeds of these adjustments are measured by 
  and    for inflation and money respectively. Hence, Eqs. (2) and (3) are replicated for the 
other two ‘finance and inflation’ pairs (‘efficiency and inflation’ and ‘credit and inflation’). 
The same deterministic trend assumptions employed in the cointegration tests are used and 
optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is consistent with the AIC (Liew, 2004).  
The cointegration relations in Panel A of Table 3 have signs that are consistent with 
the predictions from economic theory. This confirms the existing consensus that money, 
credit and the ability to transform money into credit (allocation efficiency) all have a positive 
long-term effect on inflation. Panel B of Table 3 shows feedbacks coefficients for the 
cointegrating vectors or the short-run adjustments of inflation and its financial dynamic 
fundamentals. Some adjustments are significantly different from zero, implying that these 
fundamentals are not weakly exogenous with regard to the parameters of the cointegration 
relationship in Panel A.  In case of any deviation from the long-run equilibrium, these 
variables respond and adjust the system back to equilibrium. Only the fundamentals of 
financial depth are particularly significant in adjusting inflation to the equilibrium. The 
fundamentals of credit and ability of banks to transform money into credit are not significant 
in adjusting inflation to the equilibrium. Hence, in the long-run, short-term adjustments in the 
ability of banks to transform money into credit do not matter in correcting inflation.  A 
possible explanation for this outcome is the substantially documented surplus liquidity issues 
in African financial institutions already discussed in Section 2 (Saxegaard, 2006). This is 
17 
 
confirmed by the insignificance of the credit adjusting estimates of financial activity. Hence, 
allocation inefficiency and correspondingly, limited financial activity (credit) partially explain 
these results. The ECTs have the expected signs and are in the right interval for a stable error 
correction mechanism (See sixth point in Section 4.4 on robustness checks for discussion).  
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
 In order to ensure that our results are robust, we have performed the following.  (1) 
For every financial dynamic (money, efficiency or credit) two indicators have been employed. 
Thus, the findings have encapsulated measures of financial intermediary dynamics both from 
banking and financial system perspectives.  (2) Both homogenous and heterogeneous 
assumptions have been applied in the unit root tests. (3) Optimal lag selection for goodness of 
fit in model specifications has been consistent with the recommendations of Liew (2004)
17
. 
(4) By using bivariate analysis in cointegration tests and corresponding VECM estimations, 
we have focused on the problem statement and limited causality misspecification issues.  (5) 
The fundamentals of money and the hypothesis (allocation efficiency) in explaining inflation 
adjustments to the long-run equilibrium have been checked with the effect of credit (financial 
activity). (6) The signs and intervals of the ECTs conform to theory. It is worthwhile laying 
emphasis on this sixth point. In principle, the speed of adjustment should be between zero and 
‘minus one’ (0, -1) for stable error correction mechanism. Hence, if the ECTs are not within 
this interval, then the model is misspecified (and needs adjustment), the data is inadequate 
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 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
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(perhaps owing to issues with degrees of freedom)
18
 or the error correction mechanism is 
unstable.  
“Insert Table 3 here”  
 
4.5 Policy implications 
  
Based on the findings, we confirm the Saxegaard (2006) hypothesis that the presence 
of excess liquidity in African financial institutions restricts the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. The finding is also broadly consistent with earlier literature (Agénor et al., 2004; 
Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998) that motivated the empirical underpinnings of Saxegaard.  
The results of financial depth are consistent with the traditional strand of monetary 
policy in which discretionary arrangements favor the long-term effect of monetary policy on 
inflation. This is favorable to arrangements such as international economic integration 
(monetary unions and inflation targeting for example). Conversely, the findings of financial 
efficiency and financial activity are consistent with the non-traditional strand of policy 
regimes that limit the ability of monetary authorities to use policy to offset price fluctuations. 
Hence, the inability of aggregate financial dynamic fundamentals of efficiency and activity to 
affect consumer prices is in line with the stance of Week (2010) who views this International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) oriented approach as absurdly inappropriate because a vast majority of 
SSA lacks the instruments to make monetary policy effective. Accordingly, since a great 
chunk of the monetary base in the sampled countries does not transit through the banking 
system, monetary policy instruments without financial intermediation should also be 
considered as means of fighting consumer price inflation.  
                                                 
18
 “The error correction term tells us the speed with which our model returns to equilibrium following an 
exogenous shock. It should be negatively signed, indicating a move back towards equilibrium, a positive sign 
indicates movement away from equilibrium. The coefficient should lie between 0 and 1, 0 suggesting no 
adjustment one time period later, 1 indicates full adjustment. The error correction term can be either the 
difference between the dependent and explanatory variable (lagged once) or the error term (lagged once), they 
are in effect the same thing” (Babazadeh & Farrokhnejad, 2012, p.73).  
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It is also interesting to discuss some measures that could be used to tackle the issue of 
surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. (1) Voluntary holding of excess liquidity 
could be mitigated by: easing difficulties encountered by banks in tracking their positions at 
the central bank that may require them to hold reserves above the statutory limits; 
reinforcement of institutions that would favor interbank lending so as to ease borrowing 
between banks for contingency purposes and; improve infrastructure so that remote bank 
branches may not need to hold excess reserves due to transportation problems. (2) Involuntary 
holding of excess liquidity could also be avoided by: decreasing the inability of banks to lend, 
especially in situations where interest rates are regulated
19
; creating conditions to sustain the 
spread between bonds and reserves so that, commercial banks can invest excess liquidity in 
the bond markets; stifling the unwillingness of banks to expand lending by reducing 
asymmetric information and lack of competition and; developing regional stock exchange 
markets to broaden investment opportunities for commercial banks.  
 
5. Conclusion  
There is a general consensus among analysts that significant money stock expansions 
that are not coupled with sustained credit increases are less likely to have inflationary 
consequences. This paper has reframed the consensus into an important question policy 
makers are most likely to ask today. In the long-run, do short-term adjustments in the ability 
of banks to transform money into credit matter in correcting inflation?  To assess this concern, 
the long-run incidences of money (financial depth), credit (financial activity) and efficiency 
on inflation are tested and associated misalignments are derived in order to examine which 
short-run adjustments matter in correcting inflation. Three main findings have been 
established. (1) There are significant long-run relationships (equilibriums) between inflation 
and financial dynamic fundamentals (money, credit and efficiency). (2) The error correction 
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 For instance this is the case of the CEMAC region where the central bank sets a floor for lending rates and a  
ceiling for deposit rates above and below which interest rates are negotiated freely. 
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mechanism is stable in all specifications but in case of any disequilibrium, only the 
fundamentals of financial depth (money) are particularly significant in adjusting inflation to 
the long-run relationship. (3) The fundamentals of financial activity (credit) and allocation 
efficiency are not significant in adjusting inflation to the equilibrium. Hence, in the long-run, 
short-term adjustments in the ability of banks to transform money into credit do not matter in 
correcting inflation. A possible explanation for this outcome is the substantially documented 
surplus liquidity issues in African banking institutions (Saxegard, 2006). Policy implications 
have been discussed.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Panel unit root tests  
         
  Panel A: LLC tests of homogenous panel 
  Money 
(Financial  Depth) 
Credit 
(Financial Activity 
Hypothesis 
(Financial Efficiency) 
 
Inflation 
  M2 Fdgdp Pcrb Pcrbof BcBd FcFd  
Level c 3.396 2.616 1.519 1.057 0.346 0.055 -0.271 
ct 3.138 3.820 2.887 2.644 0.701 2.230 0.264 
First 
difference 
c -2.255** -1.328* 0.431 -0.167 1.096 0.861 3.142 
ct -1.916** -0.415 -3.26*** -3.58*** 2.637 1.796 6.848 
         
  Panel B: IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  Money 
(Financial  Depth) 
Credit 
(Financial Activity 
Hypothesis 
(Financial Efficiency) 
 
Inflation 
  M2 Fdgdp Pcrb Pcrbof BcBd FcFd  
Level c 2.926 2.764 3.099 2.279 0.088 -0.011 0.694 
ct 3.131 3.870 3.266 2.963 1.136 1.466 0.833 
First 
difference 
c -3.73*** -2.115** -1.367* -1.897** -3.24*** -1.357* -5.55*** 
ct -2.032** -1.367* -1.223 -1.947** -2.026** -0.924 -3.69*** 
         
Notes: ***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via HQC for LLC test and  AIC for IPS test. Optimal lag for the most part is 2. LLC: Levin, 
Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. 
FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Bivariate heterogeneous Pedroni  Engle-Granger panel based cointegration tests 
             
 Money (Depth) and Inflation Credit (Activity)  and Inflation Efficiency (Hypothesis) and Inflation 
 M2 and Inflation Fdgdp and Inflation Pcrb and Inflation Pcrbof and Inflation BcBd and Inflation FcFd and Inflation 
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Panel v-Statistics  -0.484 -1.598 -0.712 -2.066 -0.885 -2.608 -0.639 -2.377 -0.861 -2.447 -1.160 -2.871 
Panel rho-Statistics -1.445* -1.686** -1.677** -1.630* -2.4*** -2.12** -2.71*** -2.09** -2.8*** -2.9*** -2.62*** -1.89** 
Panel PP-Statistics -1.82** -3.70*** -2.083** -3.4*** -2.7*** -3.6*** -2.94*** -3.7*** -3.1*** -4.2*** -3.19*** -3.7*** 
Panel ADF-Statistics -0.721 -1.526* -1.131 -1.68** 0.202 0.795 -0.399 -0.074 -1.07 -1.68** -0.626 0.111 
             
Group rho-Statistics -0.373 -0.340 -0.797 -0.287 -1.120 -0.561 -1.764** -1.375* -1.67** -1.525* -1.208 -0.742 
Group PP-Statistics -1.534* -4.02*** -2.36*** -4.3*** -2.6*** -4.5*** -3.21*** -5.6*** -1.91** -2.6*** -2.75*** -6.4*** 
Group ADF-Statistics -0.300 -1.988** -1.313* -2.29** 0.703 0.697 -0.140 -0.587 0.041 0.183 0.247 0.508 
             
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. M2: 
Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System 
Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. No deterministic trend assumption. 
Maximum lags is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via  AIC. Optimal lags for the most part is 1, with exceptions of tests for financial system 
efficiency and financial system activity where 3 and 2 lags are used respectively.  
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Table 3: Vector Error Correction Model (Cointegration and short-term adjustment coefficients) 
   
Panel A: Estimates of cointegration relationships 
        
 
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
Money Supply 24.966 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.301)      
Liquid Liabilities  --- 25.864 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.942)     
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
Banking System  --- --- 36.581 --- --- --- 
   (1.122)    
Financial System  --- --- --- 38.041 --- --- 
    (1.280)   
 
Efficiency  
(Hypothesis) 
Banking System  --- --- --- --- 23.806 --- 
     (0.992)  
Financial System  --- --- --- --- --- 9.867 
      (0.503) 
        
Panel B: Estimates of short term adjustment coefficients 
        
 D[Inflation] -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.205*** -0.204*** -0.163*** -0.187*** 
  (-4.945) (-4.865) (-4.781) (-4.851) (-3.811) (-4.736) 
 
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
D[Money Supply] -0.0002*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-2.563)      
D[Liquid Liabilities] --- -0.0001* --- --- --- --- 
  (-1.971)     
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
D[Banking System] --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 
   (-0.843)    
D[Financial System] --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- 
    (-1.023)   
Efficiency  
(Hypothesis) 
D[Banking System] --- --- --- --- -0.0001 --- 
     (-0.388)  
D[Financial System] --- --- --- --- --- -0.000 
      (-0.612) 
        
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The deterministic trend assumptions and lag selection criteria  for the 
VECM are the same as in the cointegration tests. ( ): t- statistics. D[ ]: First difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics  
  Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
 
 
Financial 
Development 
 
Financial 
Depth  
Money Supply 0.397 0.246 0.001 1.141 267 
Liquid Liabilities  0.312 0.206 0.001 0.948 270 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  System Efficiency 0.638 0.349 0.070 2.103 296 
Financial System Efficiency 0.645 0.337 0.139 1.669 270 
Financial 
Activity  
Banking System Activity 0.203 0.190 0.001 0.825 265 
Financial System Activity 0.214 0.200  0.001 0.796  270 
        
Dependent   Variable  Consumer   Price  Index  20.524 32.416 -100.00 200.03 297 
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations. Fin: Financial.  
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Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Inflation  Infl. The Consumer Price Index: CPI (Annual %). It 
measures changes in the price level of a market 
basket of consumer goods and services purchased 
by households. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth 
(Liquid liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP). These 
include demand, savings and time deposits.   
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits (Private credit by 
deposit banks/ demand, savings and time deposits). 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits (Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions/ demand, savings and time 
deposits). 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
Money  Hypothesis  Credit     
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Inflation   
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Infl.   
1.000 0.987 0.172 0.199 0.776 0.758 -0.357 M2 Financial 
Depth   1.000 0.171 0.193 0.779 0.762 -0.380 Fdgdp 
  1.00 0.955 0.674 0.684 -0.205 BcBd Financial 
Efficiency    1.00 0.697 0.736 -0.211 FcFd 
    1.00 0.985 -0.335 Pcrb Financial 
Activity       1.000 -0.339 Pcrbof 
      1.000 Inflation  
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: 
Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit (Banking Intermediary 
Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary Activity).  Infl: Inflation.  
 
 
 
References  
 
Acquaah, M., Adjei, M. C., & Mensa-Bonsu, I. F. (2008). Competitive Strategy, 
Environmental Characteristics and Performance of African Emerging Economies: Lessons 
from Firms in Ghana, Journal of African Business, 9(1), 93-120.  
 
Agénor, P. R., Aizenman, J., & and Hoffmaister, A. W. (2004). The Credit Crunch in East 
Asia: What Can Bank Excess Liquid Assets Tell Us? Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 23, 27–49. 
23 
 
 
Agénor, P. R., McDermott, C. J., & Prasad, E., S. (2000). Macroeconomic fluctuations in 
developing countries: Some stylized facts, World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 251–286. 
 
Asongu, S. A. (2011a). Why do French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial 
efficiency?,  Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 2(2), 94-108.  
Asongu, S. A. (2011b). Law, finance, economic growth and welfare: why does legal origin 
matter?. Institutions and Economies: Forthcoming. 
Asongu, S. A. (2011c). Law, finance and investment: does legal origin matter?, Institutions 
and Economies: Forthcoming. 
 
Asongu, S. A. (2012). Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in 
African Countries, Journal of African Business, 13(3), 183-199.  
 
Asongu, S. A. (2013a). African Stock Market Performance Dynamics: A Multidimensional 
Convergence Assessment, Journal of African Business: Forthcoming.  
 
Asongu, S. A. (2013b). Does Money Matter in Africa? New Empirics on Long- and Short-run 
Effects of Monetary Policy on Output and Prices, African Governance and Development 
Institute Working Paper.  
 
Asongu, S. A. (2013c). A Short-run Schumpeterian Trip to Embryonic African Monetary 
Zone, Economics Bulletin, 33(1), 859-873.  
 
Babazadeh, M., & Farrokhnejad, F. (2012). Effects of Short-run and Long-run Changes in 
Foreign Exchange Rates on Banks’ Profit, International Journal of Business and 
Management, 7 (17), 70-77. 
Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S. N., & Lederer, S. (2009). Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues, Journal of African Business, 10(2), 
141-162. 
Bernanke, B. S., & Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the black box: the credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 27-48.  
 
24 
 
Bhaduri, S., & Durai, S. R. S. (2012). A note on excess money growth and inflation 
dynamics: evidence from threshold regression, MPRA Paper No. 38036. 
 
Bordo, M. D., & Jeanne, O. (2002). Monetary policy and asset prices: does "benign neglect" 
make sense?, International Finance, 5(2), 139-164. 
 
Borio, C., & Lowe, P. (2002). Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the 
nexus, BIS Working Paper No. 114. 
 
Borio, C., & Lowe, P. (2004). Securing sustainable price stability: should credit come back 
from the wilderness?, BIS Working Paper No. 157. 
 
Camarero, M., & Tamarit, C. (2002). A panel cointegration approach to the estimation of the 
peseta real exchange rate, Journal of Macroeconomics. 24, 371-393. 
Darley, W. K. (2012). Increasing Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Public Policy Challenges, Strategies, and Implications, Journal of African Business, 13(1), 
62-69.  
 
Detken, C., & Smets, F. (2004). Asset price booms and monetary policy, in Horst Siebert (ed.) 
Macroeconomic Policies in the World Economy, Springer, Berlin, pp. 189-227. 
 
Dwyer, G. P.,  &  Hafer, R. W. (1999). Are Money Growth and Inflation still Related, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Second Quarter, 32-43. 
 
Engle, R. F., & Granger, W. J. (1987). Cointegration and error correction: Representation, 
estimation and testing, Econometrica, 55, 251-276.  
 
FAO (2007). Food Outlook, November. http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ah876e/ah876e00.htm 
(accessed on: 13/04/2013). 
 
Fielding, D., & Shields, K.  (2005). Asymmetries in the Effects of Monetary Policy: The Case 
of South Africa, University of Otago, Economic Discussion Papers No. 0509.  
 
Fujii, T. (2011). Impact of food inflation poverty in the Philippines. SMU Economics &  
Statistics Working Paper No. 14-2011. 
 
25 
 
Ganev, G.,Y.,, Molnar, K., Rybinski, K., & Wozniak, P. (2002). Transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Report No. 52.  Center for Social and 
Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw. 
 
Gerlach, S., & Svensson, L.  (2003). Money and Inflation in the Euro Area: a Case for 
Monetary Indicators?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(8), 1649-1672. 
 
Ghironi, F., & Rebucci, A. (2000).  Monetary rules for emerging market economies, Boston 
College Economics Department. Working Paper No. 476. 
 
Gries, T., Kraft, M., & Meierrieks, D. (2009). Linkages between financial deepening, trade 
openness, and economic development: causality evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, World 
Development, 37(12), 1849-1860. 
 
Goujon, M. (2006). Fighting inflation in a dollarized economy: The case of Vietnam, Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 34, 564-581.  
 
Gupta, R., Jurgilas, M., & Kabundi, A. (2010a). The effect of monetary policy on real house 
price growth in South Africa: A factor Augmented Vector Auto regression (FAVAR) 
Approach, Economic modelling, 27(1), 315-323.  
 
Gupta, R., Miller, S. M., Van Wyk, D. (2010b). Financial Market Liberalization, Monetary 
Policy and Housing Price Dynamics, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, 
Working Paper 2010-06.  
 
Hafer, R. W., &  Kutan, A. (2002). Detrending and the money–output link: International 
evidence, Southern Economic Journal pp. 69(1), 159–174. 
 
Hayo, B. (1999). Money–output Granger causality revisited: An empirical analysis of EU 
countries, Applied Economics, 31(11), 1489–1501. 
 
Hendrix, C., Haggard, S., & Magaloni, B. (2009). Grievance and Opportunity: Food Prices, 
Political Regime and Protest, Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies 
Association Convention, New York (August, 2009).  
 
Ibeh, K. I. N., Ibrahim, E., & Ezepue, P. O. (2007). Factors Stimulating Initial Export 
Activity. Any Differences for Nigerian Firms? Journal of African Business, 8(2), 7-26.  
26 
 
 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels, 
Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53-74. 
 
Ivanic, M., & Martin, W. (2008, April). Implications of Higher Global Food Prices for 
Poverty in Low-Income Countries, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4594. 
 
Kao, C. (1999). Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data, 
Journal of Econometrics, 90, 1–44. 
 
Khan, M. S. (2011). The Design and Effects of Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Journal of African Economies, 20(suppl_2), -ii35.  
 
Leeper E. M., & Roush, J. E. (2002). Putting ‘M’ back into Monetary Policy, Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking, 35(6), 1217-1256. 
 
Levin, A., Lin, C. F., & Chu, C. S. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and 
finite-sample properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1-24. 
 
Liew, V. K. (2004). Which lag selection criteria should we employ?, Economics Bulletin, 
3(33), 1-9. 
 
Lucas, R. E. (1980). Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money, American 
Economic Review, 70, 1005-1014. 
 
Maddala, G. S., & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a 
new simple test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, 631-652. 
 
Mangani, R. (2011). The Effects of Monetary Policy on Prices in Malawi, Department of 
Economics, University of Malawi.  
 
Masters, W., & Shively, G. (2008). Special Issue on the World Food Crisis, Agricultural  
Economics, 39, 373-374. 
 
Mishkin, F. S. (2002). The Role of Output Stabilization in the Conduct of Monetary Policy, 
International Finance, 5(2), 213-227. 
 
Mundell, R. (1972). African trade, politics and money. In Tremblay, R., ed., Africa and 
27 
 
Monetary Integration. Les Editions HRW, Montreal, pp. 11-67. 
 
Musila, J., & Al-Zyoud, H. (2012). Exchange Rate Volatility and International Trade Flows in 
sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Evidence, Journal of African Business, 13(2), 115-122.  
 
Ncube, M., & Ndou, E. (2011). Monetary Policy Transmission, House Prices and Consumer 
Spending in South Africa: An SVAR Approach, Working Paper Series No. 133, African 
Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia.  
 
Ngalawa, H., & Viegi, N. (2011). Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks in Malawi”, 
South African Journal of Economics, 79(3), 224-250.  
 
Nissanke, M., & Aryeetey, E. (1998). Financial Integration and Development: Liberalization 
and Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa London, Routledge. 
 
Nogueira, R. P. (2009). Is monetary policy really neutral in the long-run? Evidence for some 
emerging and developed economies, Economics Bulletin, 29(3), 2432-2437. 
 
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Special Issue, 653-670. 
 
Piesse, J., & Thirtle, C. (2009). Three bubbles and a panic: an explanatory review of recent  
food commodity price events, Food Policy, 34(2), 119-129. 
 
Roffia, B., &  Zaghini, A. (2008). Excess Money Growth and Inflation Dynamics, Bank of 
Italy Temi di Discussione,  Working Paper No. 657. 
 
Rolfe, R. J., & Woodward, D. P. (2004). Attracting foreign investment through privatization: 
the Zambian experience, Journal of African Business, 5(1), 5-27.  
 
Saxegaard, M. (2006). Excess liquidity and effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from 
sub-Saharan Africa, IMF Working Paper 06/115.  
Simpasa, A., Gurara, D., Shimeles, A., Vencatachellum, D., & Ncube, M. (2011). Inflation 
Dynamics in selected East African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, AfDB 
Policy Brief.  
28 
 
Starr, M. (2005). Does money matter in the CIS? Effects of monetary policy on output and 
prices, Journal of Comparative Economics, 33, 441-461. 
 
Stock J. H., & Watson, M. W. (1999). Forecasting Inflation”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 44(2), 293-335. 
 
The Economists (2012). Africa: open for business. The potential, challenges and risks, A 
report from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  
http://www.globalnegotiator.com/blog_en/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Africa-New-
Opportunities-for-Business-EIU.pdf (accessed: 12/04/2013).  
 
Trecroci, C., & Vega-Croissier, J. L. (2000). The information content of M3 for future 
inflation, ECB Working Paper No. 33. 
 
Tuomi, K. (2011). The Role of the Investment Climate and Tax Incentives in the Foreign 
Direct Investment Decision: Evidence from South Africa, Journal of African Business, 12(1), 
133-147.  
 
Van den Noord, P. (2006). Are house price near a peak? A probit analysis for 17 OECD 
countries, OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 488. 
 
Von Braun, J. (2008). Rising Food Prices: Dimension, Causes, Impact and Responses. Key  
Note Address at World Food Programme (9th April 2008).  
<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp175955.pdf>  
(accessed: 13/04/2013). 
 
Weeks, J. (2010). Why Monetary Policy is Irrelevant in Africa South of the Sahara, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, Center for Development and Policy Research, Development 
Viewpoint No. 53. http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file59766.pdf (accessed: 
12/04/2013).  
 
Wodon, Q., & Zaman, H. (2010). High food prices in sub-Saharan Africa: poverty impact and 
policy responses, World Bank Research Observer, 25(1), 157-176. 
 
World Bank (2008). High food prices: a harsh new reality.  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,contentMDK:2166588  
3~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469372,00.html (accessed: 21/01/2012). 
